Belief-based and analytic processing in transitive inference depends on premise integration difficulty.

Three experiments investigated belief-based versus analytic processing in transitive inference. Belief-based and analytic processing were inferred from conclusion acceptance rates for problems with conclusions that were either valid or invalid and believable or unbelievable. Premise integration diff...

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Published in:Memory & Cognition Vol. 38; no. 7; pp. 928 - 941
Main Author: ANDREWS, GLENDA
Format: Article
Published: Springer Nature Oct2010
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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      dt: Oct2010
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      pub: Springer Nature
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        atl: Belief-based and analytic processing in transitive inference depends on premise integration difficulty.
      aug:
        au: ANDREWS, GLENDA
        affil: Grififth University, Gold Coast Campus, Southport, Queensland, Australia
      su:
        Analysis of variance
        Cognition
        Conflict (Psychology)
        Culture
        Logic
        Problem solving
        Probability theory
        Research funding
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        subj:
          Analysis of variance
          Cognition
          Conflict (Psychology)
          Culture
          Logic
          Problem solving
          Probability theory
          Research funding
      ab: Three experiments investigated belief-based versus analytic processing in transitive inference. Belief-based and analytic processing were inferred from conclusion acceptance rates for problems with conclusions that were either valid or invalid and believable or unbelievable. Premise integration difficulty was manipulated by varying premise integration time (Experiment 1), premise presentation order (Experiment 2), and the markedness of the relational terms in the premises (Experiment 3). In all the conditions, reasoning accuracy and rated confidence were lower on conflict problems, where belief-based and analytic processes yielded different responses. Participants relied more on analytic processing and less on belief-based processing in conditions in which premise integration was easier. Fluid intelligence and premise integration ability predicted analytical reasoning on conflict problems after reasoning on the no-conflict problems was controlled for. The findings were related to three dual-process models of belief bias. They provide the first evidence of belief bias in transitive inference.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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