DO THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS REST ON A MISTAKE?
The article offers the author's insights regarding the dependence of the standard theories of consciousness on mistake. The author says that the standards theories of consciousness had adopted reductionism, and rejected the reductive explanation being referred as primitivism. Moreover, he discusses...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Issues Vol. 20; no. 1; pp. 333 - 368 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Oct2010
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=55511943&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 55511943 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 15336077 1731 jtl: Philosophical Issues issn: 15336077 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Oct2010 vid: 20 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 55511943 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2010.00189.x ppf: 333 ppct: 35 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 366KB tig: atl: DO THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS REST ON A MISTAKE? aug: au: Pautz, Adam affil: University of Texas at Austin su: Consciousness Reductionism Primitivism Act psychology Mind & body sug: subj: Consciousness Reductionism Primitivism Act psychology Mind & body ab: The article offers the author's insights regarding the dependence of the standard theories of consciousness on mistake. The author says that the standards theories of consciousness had adopted reductionism, and rejected the reductive explanation being referred as primitivism. Moreover, he discusses the two parts of tracking intentionalism under the standard theories of consciousness which are the response-independent reductionism and the tracking theory. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophical Issues is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophical Issues holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2010 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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