A vehicular theory of corporeal qualia (a gift to computationalists).
I have argued elsewhere that non-sentential representations that are the close kin of scale models can be, and often are, realized by computational processes. I will attempt here to weaken any resistance to this claim that happens to issue from those who favor an across-the-board computational theor...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 152; no. 1; pp. 103 - 126 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jan2011
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=55613357&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 55613357 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2011 vid: 152 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 55613357 10.1007/s11098-009-9463-x ppf: 103 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 329KB tig: atl: A vehicular theory of corporeal qualia (a gift to computationalists). aug: au: Waskan, Jonathan affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 105 Gregory Hall, 810 S. Wright Street Urbana 61801 USA su: Sensory perception Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Cognitive science Other minds (Theory of knowledge) Qualia sug: subj: Sensory perception Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Cognitive science Other minds (Theory of knowledge) Qualia keyword: Chinese Room Computational theory of mind Externalism Formats Models Perception Representations ab: I have argued elsewhere that non-sentential representations that are the close kin of scale models can be, and often are, realized by computational processes. I will attempt here to weaken any resistance to this claim that happens to issue from those who favor an across-the-board computational theory of cognitive activity. I will argue that embracing the idea that certain computers harbor nonsentential models gives proponents of the computational theory of cognition the means to resolve the conspicuous disconnect between the sentential character of the data structures they posit and the nonsentential qualitative character of our perceptual experiences of corporeal (i.e., spatial, kinematic, and dynamic) properties. Along the way, I will question the viability of some externalist remedies for this disconnect, and I will explain why the computational theory put forward here falls quite clearly beyond the useful bounds of the Chinese-Room argument. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2011. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2011 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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