Is Frequentist Testing Vulnerable to the Base-Rate Fallacy?
This article calls into question the charge that frequentist testing is susceptible to the base-rate fallacy. It is argued that the apparent similarity between examples like the Harvard Medical School test and frequentist testing is highly misleading. A closer scrutiny reveals that such examples hav...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 77; no. 4; pp. 565 - 584 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Oct2010
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=55670632&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 55670632 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2010 vid: 77 iid: 4 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 55670632 10.1086/656009 ppf: 565 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 1012KB tig: atl: Is Frequentist Testing Vulnerable to the Base-Rate Fallacy? aug: au: Spanos, Aris affil: Department of Economics, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061 su: Base rate fallacies Harvard Medical School Resemblance (Philosophy) Statistical sampling Statistical correlation Probability theory sug: subj: Base rate fallacies Harvard Medical School Resemblance (Philosophy) Statistical sampling Statistical correlation Probability theory ab: This article calls into question the charge that frequentist testing is susceptible to the base-rate fallacy. It is argued that the apparent similarity between examples like the Harvard Medical School test and frequentist testing is highly misleading. A closer scrutiny reveals that such examples have none of the basic features of a proper frequentist test, such as legitimate data, hypotheses, test statistics, and sampling distributions. Indeed, the relevant error probabilities are replaced with the false positive/negative rates that constitute deductive calculations based on known probabilities among events. As a result, the ampliative dimension of frequentist induction--learning from data about the underlying data-generating mechanism--is missing. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2010 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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