Einstein, Kant, and the A Priori.
Kant's original version of transcendental philosophy took both Euclidean geometry and the Newtonian laws of motion to be synthetic a priori constitutive principles—which, from Kant's point of view, function as necessary presuppositions for applying our fundamental concepts of space, time, matter, an...
| Publicado en: | Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement Vol. 83; no. 63; pp. 95 - 113 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
2008
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=57118122&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 57118122 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13582461 38BJ jtl: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement issn: 13582461 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2008 vid: 83 iid: 63 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 57118122 10.1017/S1358246108000064 ppf: 95 ppct: 18 formats: tig: atl: Einstein, Kant, and the A Priori. aug: au: Friedman, Michael su: Transcendentalism (Philosophy) Philosophy Euclidean algorithm Geometry Motion Spacetime sug: subj: Transcendentalism (Philosophy) Philosophy Euclidean algorithm Geometry Motion Spacetime ab: Kant's original version of transcendental philosophy took both Euclidean geometry and the Newtonian laws of motion to be synthetic a priori constitutive principles—which, from Kant's point of view, function as necessary presuppositions for applying our fundamental concepts of space, time, matter, and motion to our sensible experience of the natural world. Although Kant had very good reasons to view the principles in question as having such a constitutively a priori role, we now know, in the wake of Einstein's work, that they are not in fact a priori in the stronger sense of being fixed necessary conditions for all human experience in general, eternally valid once and for all. And it is for precisely this reason that Kant's original version of transcendental philosophy must now be either rejected entirely or (at least) radically reconceived. Most philosophy of science since Einstein has taken the former route: the dominant view in logical empiricism, for example, was that the Kantian synthetic a priori had to be rejected once and for all in the light of the general theory of relativity. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y dt: @attributes: year: 2008 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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