Spacetime and Mereology.
Unrestricted Composition (UC) is, roughly, the claim that given any objects at all, there is something which those objects compose. (UC) conflicts in an obvious way with common sense. It has as a consequence, for instance, that there is something which has as parts my nose and the moon. One of the m...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 74; no. 1; pp. 17 - 36 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Jan2011
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=57677110&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 57677110 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2011 vid: 74 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 57677110 10.1007/s10670-010-9262-y ppf: 17 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 277KB tig: atl: Spacetime and Mereology. aug: au: Wake, Andrew affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester, Rochester 14627-0078 USA su: Universals (Philosophy) Spacetime Vagueness (Philosophy) Whole & parts (Philosophy) Ambiguity Meaning (Philosophy) Lewis, David Sider, Theodore sug: subj: Universals (Philosophy) Spacetime Vagueness (Philosophy) Whole & parts (Philosophy) Ambiguity Meaning (Philosophy) Lewis, David Sider, Theodore ab: Unrestricted Composition (UC) is, roughly, the claim that given any objects at all, there is something which those objects compose. (UC) conflicts in an obvious way with common sense. It has as a consequence, for instance, that there is something which has as parts my nose and the moon. One of the more influential arguments for (UC) is Theodore Sider's version of the Argument from Vagueness. (A version of the Argument from Vagueness was first presented by David Lewis (), pp. 212-213). That argument purports to show that some plausible claims concerning the nature of vagueness entail (UC). In this paper I will suggest a response to this argument. I will show that the proponent of Supersubstantivalism (SS)-the view that material objects are identical to regions of spacetime-can reject a premise of Sider's argument without denying the plausible claims concerning vagueness. Doing so requires only rejecting a certain view concerning the relationship between the proper sub-region relation and the proper parthood relation. So, proponents of (SS) are in a better position than many of us to side with common sense regarding composition. In the first section of the paper, I will present Sider's argument. In the second section, I will introduce (SS) and briefly discuss some reasons one might have to believe that it is true. In the third section, I will show how the proponent of (SS) can avoid commitment to (UC) and reject a premise of Sider's argument. Last, I'll briefly consider and respond to some objections. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2011. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2011 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|