Temporal Parts and Time Travel.

This paper argues that, in light of certain scenarios involving time travel, Sider's definition of 'instantaneous temporal part' cannot be accepted in conjunction with a semantic thesis that perdurantists often assume. I examine a rejoinder from Sider, as well as Thomson's alternative definition of...

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Publicado en:Erkenntnis Vol. 74; no. 2; pp. 225 - 241
Autor principal: Effingham, Nikk
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Mar2011
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK
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        Time travel
        Spacetime
        Sider, Ted
        Semantics (Philosophy)
        Academic dissertations
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          Time travel
          Spacetime
          Sider, Ted
          Semantics (Philosophy)
          Academic dissertations
      ab: This paper argues that, in light of certain scenarios involving time travel, Sider's definition of 'instantaneous temporal part' cannot be accepted in conjunction with a semantic thesis that perdurantists often assume. I examine a rejoinder from Sider, as well as Thomson's alternative definition of 'instantaneous temporal part', and show how neither helps. Given this, we should give up on the perdurantist semantic thesis. I end by recommending that, once we no longer accept such semantics, we should accept a new set of definitions, which are superior in certain respects to Sider's original set.
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