What will they say?-Public Announcement Games.
Dynamic epistemic logic describes the possible information-changing actions available to individual agents, and their knowledge pre- and post conditions. For example, public announcement logic describes actions in the form of public, truthful announcements. However, little research so far has consid...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 179; pp. 57 - 86 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Apr2011
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=58697230&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 58697230 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2011 vid: 179 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 58697230 10.1007/s11229-010-9838-8 ppf: 57 ppct: 29 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 350KB tig: atl: What will they say?-Public Announcement Games. aug: au: Ågotnes, Thomas Ditmarsch, Hans affil: Department of Information Science and Media Studies, University of Bergen, 5020 Bergen Norway Department of Logic, University of Sevilla, Calle Camilo José Cela s/n 41018 Sevilla Spain su: Epistemics Theory of knowledge Announcements Rational choice theory Bounded rationality Game theory sug: subj: Epistemics Theory of knowledge Announcements Rational choice theory Bounded rationality Game theory keyword: Action logic Epistemic logic Imperfect information games Modal logic Public announcements ab: Dynamic epistemic logic describes the possible information-changing actions available to individual agents, and their knowledge pre- and post conditions. For example, public announcement logic describes actions in the form of public, truthful announcements. However, little research so far has considered describing and analysing rational choice between such actions, i.e., predicting what rational self-interested agents actually will or should do. Since the outcome of information exchange ultimately depends on the actions chosen by all the agents in the system, and assuming that agents have preferences over such outcomes, this is a game theoretic scenario. This is, in our opinion, an interesting general research direction, combining logic and game theory in the study of rational information exchange. In this article we take some first steps in this direction: we consider the case where available actions are public announcements, and where each agent has a (typically epistemic) goal formula that she would like to become true. What will each agent announce? The truth of the goal formula also depends on the announcements made by other agents. We analyse such public announcement games. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2011. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2011 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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