Species Have (Partly) Intrinsic Essences.
The paper defends the doctrine that Linnaean taxa, including species, have essences that are, at least partly, underlying intrinsic, mostly genetic, properties. The consensus among philosophers of biology is that such essentialism is deeply wrong, indeed incompatible with Darwinism. I argue that bio...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 77; no. 5; pp. 648 - 662 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge University Press
Dec2010
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=59159590&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 59159590 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2010 vid: 77 iid: 5 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 59159590 10.1086/656820 ppf: 648 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 845KB tig: atl: Species Have (Partly) Intrinsic Essences. aug: au: Devitt, Michael affil: Philosophy Program, Graduate Center of the City University of New York, 365 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY su: Linnaea Species Philosophy of biology Biological evolution Natural selection Essentialism (Philosophy) sug: subj: Linnaea Species Philosophy of biology Biological evolution Natural selection Essentialism (Philosophy) ab: The paper defends the doctrine that Linnaean taxa, including species, have essences that are, at least partly, underlying intrinsic, mostly genetic, properties. The consensus among philosophers of biology is that such essentialism is deeply wrong, indeed incompatible with Darwinism. I argue that biological generalizations about the morphology, physiology, and behavior of species require structural explanations that must advert to these essential properties. The paper concludes by summarizing my responses to the objection that, according to current "species concepts," species are relational, and to the objection that essentialism cannot accommodate features of Darwinism associated with variation and change. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2010 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|