The Ontology of Patterns in Empirical Data.
This article defends the following claims. First, for patterns exhibited in empirical data, there is no criterion on which to demarcate patterns that are physically significant and patterns that are not physically significant. I call a pattern physically significant if it corresponds to a structure...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 77; no. 5; pp. 804 - 815 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Dec2010
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | This article defends the following claims. First, for patterns exhibited in empirical data, there is no criterion on which to demarcate patterns that are physically significant and patterns that are not physically significant. I call a pattern physically significant if it corresponds to a structure in the world. Second, all patterns must be regarded as physically significant. Third, distinct patterns must be regarded as providing evidence for distinct structures in the world. Fourth, in consequence, the world must be conceived as showing all possible structures. |
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