The Resilience of Computationalism.
Computationalism--the view that cognition is computation--has always been controversial. It faces two types of objection. According to insufficiency objections, computation is insufficient for some cognitive phenomenon X. According to objections from neural realization, cognitive processes are reali...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 77; no. 5; pp. 852 - 862 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Dec2010
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=59159606&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 59159606 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2010 vid: 77 iid: 5 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 59159606 10.1086/656549 ppf: 852 ppct: 10 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 599KB tig: atl: The Resilience of Computationalism. aug: au: Piccinini, Gualtiero affil: Department of Philosophy, 599 Lucas Hall MC73, 1 University Boulevard, University of Missouri, St. Louis, MO 63121 su: Cognition Computational neuroscience Philosophy of science Information processing Concepts sug: subj: Cognition Computational neuroscience Philosophy of science Information processing Concepts ab: Computationalism--the view that cognition is computation--has always been controversial. It faces two types of objection. According to insufficiency objections, computation is insufficient for some cognitive phenomenon X. According to objections from neural realization, cognitive processes are realized by neural processes, but neural processes have feature Y, and having Y is incompatible with being (or realizing) computations. In this article, I explain why computationalism has survived these objections. To adjudicate the dispute between computationalism and its foes, I will conclude that we need a better account of computation. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2010 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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