The Suppositional Ramsey Test and Decision-Instability.

I analyse the relationship between the Ramsey Test (RT) for the acceptance of indicative conditionals and the so-called problem of decision-instability. In particular, I argue that the situations which allegedly bring about this problem are troublesome just in case the relevant conditionals are eval...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy Vol. 30; no. 1; pp. 53 - 58
Autor principal: Duca, Simone
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Apr2011
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=60116932&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 60116932
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        01677411
        NM2
      jtl: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy
      issn: 01677411
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Apr2011
      vid: 30
      iid: 1
      pid: 237
      pub: Springer Nature
    artinfo:
      ui:
        60116932
        10.1007/s11245-010-9090-3
      ppf: 53
      ppct: 5
      formats:
        fmt:
          @attributes:
            type: P
            size: 140KB
      tig:
        atl: The Suppositional Ramsey Test and Decision-Instability.
      aug:
        au: Duca, Simone
        affil: Department of Philosophy, Ruhr University, Bochum Germany
      su:
        Decision support systems
        Indicative mood
        Test interpretation
        Metacognitive therapy
        Risk assessment
      sug:
        subj:
          Decision support systems
          Indicative mood
          Test interpretation
          Metacognitive therapy
          Risk assessment
      ab: I analyse the relationship between the Ramsey Test (RT) for the acceptance of indicative conditionals and the so-called problem of decision-instability. In particular, I argue that the situations which allegedly bring about this problem are troublesome just in case the relevant conditionals are evaluated by non-suppositional versions, e.g. causal/evidential, of the test. In contrast, a suppositional RT, by highlighting the metacognitive nature of the evaluation of indicative conditionals, allows an agent to run a simulation of such evaluation, without yet committing her to the acceptance of such conditionals. I conclude that a suppositional interpretation of RT is superior to its non-suppositional counterparts and by briefly showing that a suppositional RT is compatible with a deliberational decision theory.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy is a copyright of Springer, 2011. All Rights Reserved.
      item: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy
      holder: Springer Nature
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2011
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N