On the distinction between Peirce's abduction and Lipton's Inference to the best explanation.
I argue against the tendency in the philosophy of science literature to link abduction to the inference to the best explanation (IBE), and in particular, to claim that Peircean abduction is a conceptual predecessor to IBE. This is not to discount either abduction or IBE. Rather the purpose of this p...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 180; no. 3; pp. 419 - 443 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jun2011
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=60262356&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 60262356 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2011 vid: 180 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 60262356 10.1007/s11229-009-9709-3 ppf: 419 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 233KB tig: atl: On the distinction between Peirce's abduction and Lipton's Inference to the best explanation. aug: au: Campos, Daniel affil: Brooklyn College, City University of New York, New York USA su: Abduction Scientific literature Lipton, Peter Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders), 1839-1914 Hypothesis Pragmatism sug: subj: Abduction Scientific literature Lipton, Peter Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders), 1839-1914 Hypothesis Pragmatism keyword: Inference to the best explanation Peirce Scientific reasoning ab: I argue against the tendency in the philosophy of science literature to link abduction to the inference to the best explanation (IBE), and in particular, to claim that Peircean abduction is a conceptual predecessor to IBE. This is not to discount either abduction or IBE. Rather the purpose of this paper is to clarify the relation between Peircean abduction and IBE in accounting for ampliative inference in science. This paper aims at a proper classification-not justification-of types of scientific reasoning. In particular, I claim that Peircean abduction is an in-depth account of the process of generating explanatory hypotheses, while IBE, at least in Peter Lipton's thorough treatment, is a more encompassing account of the processes both of generating and of evaluating scientific hypotheses. There is then a two-fold problem with the claim that abduction is IBE. On the one hand, it conflates abduction and induction, which are two distinct forms of logical inference, with two distinct aims, as shown by Charles S. Peirce; on the other hand it lacks a clear sense of the full scope of IBE as an account of scientific inference. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2011. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2011 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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