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The Attributive/Referential Distinction, Pragmatics, Modularity of Mind and Modularization.

In this paper I deal with the attributive/referential distinction. After reviewing the literature on the issue, I adopt Jaszczolt's view based on default semantics. I relate her view to Sperber and Wilson's Principle of Relevance. I argue in favour of the modularity hypothesis in connection with pra...

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Publicado en:Australian Journal of Linguistics Vol. 31; no. 2; pp. 153 - 187
Autor principal: Capone, Alessandro
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Taylor & Francis Ltd May2011
Materias:
Modularity (Grammar)
Semantics > Study & teaching
Philosophy of language
Pragmatics education
Inference (Logic)
Modularity (Psychology)
Education
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
Sumario:In this paper I deal with the attributive/referential distinction. After reviewing the literature on the issue, I adopt Jaszczolt's view based on default semantics. I relate her view to Sperber and Wilson's Principle of Relevance. I argue in favour of the modularity hypothesis in connection with pragmatic interpretations. I also discuss the issue of modularization a la Karmiloff-Smith in connection with default inferences and, in particular, referential readings of NPs. I reply to some considerations by Cummings and use data from referential/attributive uses of NPs to show that the modularity hypothesis is defensible.