What's wrong with the evolutionary argument against naturalism?
lvin Plantinga has argued that evolutionary naturalism (the idea that God does not tinker with evolution) undermines its own rationality. Natural selection is concerned with survival and reproduction, and false beliefs conjoined with complementary motivational drives could serve the same aims as tru...
| Publicado en: | International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Vol. 69; no. 3; pp. 193 - 205 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jun2011
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=60590746&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 60590746 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00207047 IPH jtl: International Journal for Philosophy of Religion issn: 00207047 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2011 vid: 69 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 60590746 10.1007/s11153-010-9272-3 ppf: 193 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 146KB tig: atl: What's wrong with the evolutionary argument against naturalism? aug: au: Childers, Geoff affil: 3975C Bramble Lane Santa Cruz 95062 USA su: Plantinga, Ivin Naturalism Belief & doubt Philosophy of nature Evolutionary theories sug: subj: Plantinga, Ivin Naturalism Belief & doubt Philosophy of nature Evolutionary theories keyword: Bias Cognition Evolution Evolutionary argument against naturalism Plantinga ab: lvin Plantinga has argued that evolutionary naturalism (the idea that God does not tinker with evolution) undermines its own rationality. Natural selection is concerned with survival and reproduction, and false beliefs conjoined with complementary motivational drives could serve the same aims as true beliefs. Thus, argues Plantinga, if we believe we evolved naturally, we should not think our beliefs are, on average, likely to be true, including our beliefs in evolution and naturalism. I argue herein that our cognitive faculties are less reliable than we often take them to be, that it is theism which has difficulty explaining the nature of our cognition, that much of our knowledge is not passed through biological evolution but learned and transferred through culture, and that the unreliability of our cognition helps explain the usefulness of science. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: International Journal for Philosophy of Religion is a copyright of Springer, 2011. All Rights Reserved. item: International Journal for Philosophy of Religion holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2011 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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