Reconceiving Eliminative Inference.

Eliminative reasoning seems to play an important role in the sciences, but should it be part of our best theory of science? Statistical evidence, prevalent across the sciences, causes problems for eliminative inference, supporting the view that probabilistic theories of confirmation provide a better...

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Publicado en:Philosophy of Science Vol. 78; no. 2; pp. 185 - 209
Autor principal: Forber, Patrick
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press Apr2011
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        affil: Philosophy Department, Tufts University, Miner Hall, 14 Upper Campus Rd., Medford, MA 02155
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        Inference (Logic)
        Reasoning
        Science
        Probability theory
        Molecular evolution
        Biological evolution
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          Inference (Logic)
          Reasoning
          Science
          Probability theory
          Molecular evolution
          Biological evolution
      ab: Eliminative reasoning seems to play an important role in the sciences, but should it be part of our best theory of science? Statistical evidence, prevalent across the sciences, causes problems for eliminative inference, supporting the view that probabilistic theories of confirmation provide a better framework for reasoning about evidence. Here I argue that deductive elimination has an important inferential role to play in science, one that is compatible with probabilistic approaches to evidence. Eliminative inferences help frame testing problems, an essential step that determines the context for evaluating statistical evidence. I illustrate this process with examples from molecular evolutionary biology.
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