Why the Causal View of Fitness Survives.
We critically examine Denis Walsh's latest attack on the causalist view of fitness. Relying on Judea Pearl's Sure-Thing Principle and geneticist John Gillespie's model for fitness, Walsh has argued that the causal interpretation of fitness results in a reductio. We show that his conclusion only foll...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 78; no. 2; pp. 209 - 225 |
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| Autores principales: | , , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Apr2011
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=60963439&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 60963439 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2011 vid: 78 iid: 2 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 60963439 10.1086/659219 ppf: 209 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 7.1MB tig: atl: Why the Causal View of Fitness Survives. aug: au: Otsuka, Jun Turner, Trin Allen, Colin Lloyd, Elisabeth A. affil: Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Indiana University, Goodbody Hall 130, 1011 East Third Street, Bloomington, IN 47405 su: Walsh, Denis Causation (Philosophy) Pearl, Judea, 1936- Biological fitness Probability theory sug: subj: Walsh, Denis Causation (Philosophy) Pearl, Judea, 1936- Biological fitness Probability theory ab: We critically examine Denis Walsh's latest attack on the causalist view of fitness. Relying on Judea Pearl's Sure-Thing Principle and geneticist John Gillespie's model for fitness, Walsh has argued that the causal interpretation of fitness results in a reductio. We show that his conclusion only follows from misuse of the models, that is, (1) the disregard of the real biological bearing of the population-size parameter in Gillespie's model and (2) the confusion of the distinction between ordinary probability and Pearl's causal probability. Properly understood, the models used by Walsh do not threaten the causalist view of fitness. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2011 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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