The Nature of Dynamical Explanation.
The received view of dynamical explanation is that dynamical cognitive science seeks to provide covering-law explanations of cognitive phenomena. By analyzing three prominent examples of dynamicist research, I show that the received view is misleading: some dynamical explanations are mechanistic exp...
| Published in: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 78; no. 2; pp. 238 - 264 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Cambridge University Press
Apr2011
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=60963441&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 60963441 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2011 vid: 78 iid: 2 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 60963441 10.1086/659221 ppf: 238 ppct: 26 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 12.5MB tig: atl: The Nature of Dynamical Explanation. aug: au: Zednik, Carlos affil: Indiana University Cognitive Science Program, Eigenmann Building 819, 1910 East 10th Street, Bloomington, IN 47406 su: Cognitive science Philosophy of mind Research Science & law Philosophers sug: subj: Cognitive science Philosophy of mind Research Science & law Philosophers ab: The received view of dynamical explanation is that dynamical cognitive science seeks to provide covering-law explanations of cognitive phenomena. By analyzing three prominent examples of dynamicist research, I show that the received view is misleading: some dynamical explanations are mechanistic explanations and in this way resemble computational and connectionist explanations. Interestingly, these dynamical explanations invoke the mathematical framework of dynamical systems theory to describe mechanisms far more complex and distributed than the ones typically considered by philosophers. Therefore, contemporary dynamicist research reveals the need for a more sophisticated account of mechanistic explanation. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2011 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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