Knowing what we can do: actions, intentions, and the construction of phenomenal experience.

How do questions concerning consciousness and phenomenal experience relate to, or interface with, questions concerning plans, knowledge and intentions? At least in the case of visual experience the relation, we shall argue, is tight. Visual perceptual experience, we shall argue, is fixed by an agent...

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Publicado en:	Synthese Vol. 181; no. 3; pp. 375 - 395
Autores principales:	Ward, Dave, Roberts, Tom, Clark, Andy
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Springer Nature Aug2011
Materias:	Phenomenalism Consciousness Sensorimotor integration Sensory perception Theory of knowledge
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost