Group Doxastic Rationality Need Not Supervene on Individual Rationality.
There is a strong formal analogy between proposition-wise supervenience of collective doxastic rationality on individual doxastic rationality and supervenience of social choice functions on individual choice functions. In light of this analogy, the basis for List and Pettit's impossibility theorems...
| Publicado en: | Southern Journal of Philosophy Vol. 44; pp. 106 - 118 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Mar2006 Supplement 1
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=62480468&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 62480468 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384283 2GW jtl: Southern Journal of Philosophy issn: 00384283 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Mar2006 Supplement 1 vid: 44 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 62480468 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2006.tb00033.x ppf: 106 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 746KB tig: atl: Group Doxastic Rationality Need Not Supervene on Individual Rationality. aug: au: Ross, Don affil: University of Alabama at Birmingham and University of Cape Town su: Reason Social choice Theorists Supervenience (Philosophy) Judgment (Psychology) Plausibility (Logic) sug: subj: Reason Social choice Theorists Supervenience (Philosophy) Judgment (Psychology) Plausibility (Logic) ab: There is a strong formal analogy between proposition-wise supervenience of collective doxastic rationality on individual doxastic rationality and supervenience of social choice functions on individual choice functions. In light of this analogy, the basis for List and Pettit's impossibility theorems can fruitfully be compared with the basis for Arrow's. This helps to explain why List and Pettit can derive no impossibility theorem for set-wise supervenience. However, there are empirical reasons for doubting that set-wise supervenience of collective doxastic rationality on individual doxastic rationality is necessary; a systematic feedback relationship between the former and some individual behavioral dispositions is probably sufficient to dissolve mysteries about group agency. Group doxastic rationality need not supervene on individual rationality. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Southern Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Southern Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2006 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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