Bogen and Woodward's data-phenomena distinction, forms of theory-ladenness, and the reliability of data.
Some twenty years ago, Bogen and Woodward challenged one of the fundamental assumptions of the received view, namely the theory-observation dichotomy and argued for the introduction of the further category of scientific phenomena. The latter, Bogen and Woodward stressed, are usually unobservable and...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 182; no. 1; pp. 39 - 56 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Sep2011
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=63540963&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 63540963 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2011 vid: 182 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 63540963 10.1007/s11229-009-9615-8 ppf: 39 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 655KB tig: atl: Bogen and Woodward's data-phenomena distinction, forms of theory-ladenness, and the reliability of data. aug: au: Schindler, Samuel affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz, 78457 Konstanz Germany su: Bogen, James Woodward, James Reliability (Personality trait) Scientific observation Case studies Magnetic anomalies sug: subj: Bogen, James Woodward, James Reliability (Personality trait) Scientific observation Case studies Magnetic anomalies keyword: Bogen and Woodward Data Phenomena Reliability Theory-ladenness ab: Some twenty years ago, Bogen and Woodward challenged one of the fundamental assumptions of the received view, namely the theory-observation dichotomy and argued for the introduction of the further category of scientific phenomena. The latter, Bogen and Woodward stressed, are usually unobservable and inferred from what is indeed observable, namely scientific data. Crucially, Bogen and Woodward claimed that theories predict and explain phenomena, but not data. But then, of course, the thesis of theory-ladenness, which has it that our observations are influenced by the theories we hold, cannot apply. On the basis of two case studies, I want to show that this consequence of Bogen and Woodward's account is rather unrealistic. More importantly, I also object against Bogen and Woodward's view that the reliability of data, which constitutes the precondition for data-to-phenomena inferences, can be secured without the theory one seeks to test. The case studies I revisit have figured heavily in the publications of Bogen and Woodward and others: the discovery of weak neutral currents and the discovery of the zebra pattern of magnetic anomalies. I show that, in the latter case, data can be ignored if they appear to be irrelevant from a particular theoretical perspective (TLI) and that, in the former case, the tested theory can be critical for the assessment of the reliability of the data (TLA). I argue that both TLI and TLA are much stronger senses of theory-ladenness than the classical thesis and that neither TLI nor TLA can be accommodated within Bogen and Woodward's account. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2011. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2011 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|