A Strengthening of the Caesar Problem.
The neo-Fregeans have argued that definition by abstraction allows us to introduce abstract concepts such as direction and number in terms of equivalence relations such as parallelism between lines and one-one correspondence between concepts. This paper argues that definition by abstraction suffers...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 75; no. 1; pp. 123 - 137 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jul2011
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | The neo-Fregeans have argued that definition by abstraction allows us to introduce abstract concepts such as direction and number in terms of equivalence relations such as parallelism between lines and one-one correspondence between concepts. This paper argues that definition by abstraction suffers from the fact that an equivalence relation may not be sufficient to determine a unique concept. Frege's original verdict against definition by abstraction is thus reinstated. |
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