An Empirical Comparison of the Performance of Classical Power Indices.
Power indices are general measures of the relative a priori voting power of individual members of a voting body. They are useful for both positive and normative analysis of voting bodies particularly those using weighted voting. This paper applies new algorithms for computing the rival Shapley-Shubi...
| Publicado en: | Political Studies Vol. 50; no. 1; pp. 1 - 23 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Sage Publications Inc.
Mar2002
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=6412536&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 6412536 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00323217 PSZ jtl: Political Studies issn: 00323217 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Mar2002 vid: 50 iid: 1 pid: 344 pub: Sage Publications Inc. artinfo: ui: 6412536 10.1111/1467-9248.00356 ppf: 1 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 234KB tig: atl: An Empirical Comparison of the Performance of Classical Power Indices. aug: au: Leech, Dennis su: Stockholders Associations, institutions, etc. United Kingdom sug: subj: United Kingdom Stockholders Associations, institutions, etc. ab: Power indices are general measures of the relative a priori voting power of individual members of a voting body. They are useful for both positive and normative analysis of voting bodies particularly those using weighted voting. This paper applies new algorithms for computing the rival Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices for large voting bodies to shareholder voting power in a cross section of British companies. Each company is a separate voting body and there is much variation in ownership between them resulting in different power structures. Because the data are incomplete, both finite and ‘oceanic’ games of shareholder voting are analysed. The indices are appraised, using reasonable criteria, from the literature on corporate control. The results are unfavourable to the Shapley-Shubik index and suggest that the Banzhaf index much better reflects the variations in the power of shareholders between companies as the weights of shareholder blocs vary. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Political Studies is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Political Studies holder: Sage Publications Inc. dt: @attributes: year: 2002 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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