Internalist and externalist aspects of justification in scientific inquiry.
While epistemic justification is a central concern for both contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science, debates in contemporary epistemology about the nature of epistemic justification have not been discussed extensively by philosophers of science. As a step toward a coherent account of sci...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 182; no. 3; pp. 475 - 493 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Oct2011
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=65082468&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 65082468 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2011 vid: 182 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 65082468 10.1007/s11229-010-9754-y ppf: 475 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 217KB tig: atl: Internalist and externalist aspects of justification in scientific inquiry. aug: au: Staley, Kent Cobb, Aaron affil: Saint Louis University, St. Louis USA Auburn University at Montgomery, Montgomery USA su: Theory of knowledge -- Social aspects Philosophy of science Justification (Ethics) Debate Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Mayo, Deborah G. Inquiry (Theory of knowledge) sug: subj: Theory of knowledge -- Social aspects Philosophy of science Justification (Ethics) Debate Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Mayo, Deborah G. Inquiry (Theory of knowledge) keyword: Error-statistics Evidence Externalism Internalism Justification Security ab: While epistemic justification is a central concern for both contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science, debates in contemporary epistemology about the nature of epistemic justification have not been discussed extensively by philosophers of science. As a step toward a coherent account of scientific justification that is informed by, and sheds light on, justificatory practices in the sciences, this paper examines one of these debates-the internalist-externalist debate-from the perspective of objective accounts of scientific evidence. In particular, we focus on Deborah Mayo's error-statistical theory of evidence because it is a paradigmatically objective theory of evidence that is strongly informed by methodological practice. We contend that from the standpoint of such an objective theory of evidence, justification in science has both externalist and internalist characteristics. In reaching this conclusion, however, we find that the terms of the contemporary debate between internalists and externalists have to be redefined to be applicable to scientific contexts. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2011. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2011 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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