BEING WITH.
abstract What is it for two or more people to be with one another or together? And what role do empathic psychological processes play, either as essential constituents or as typical elements? As I define it, to be genuinely with each other, persons must be jointly aware of their mutual openness to m...
| Publicado en: | Southern Journal of Philosophy Vol. 49; pp. 4 - 25 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2011
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=65131111&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 65131111 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384283 2GW jtl: Southern Journal of Philosophy issn: 00384283 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jun2011 vid: 49 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 65131111 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2011.00054.x ppf: 4 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 89KB tig: atl: BEING WITH. aug: au: DARWALL, STEPHEN affil: Yale University su: Emotional contagion Empathy Slote, Michael A., 1941- Emotional state Smith, Adam, 1723-1790 Interpersonal relations sug: subj: Emotional contagion Empathy Slote, Michael A., 1941- Emotional state Smith, Adam, 1723-1790 Interpersonal relations ab: abstract What is it for two or more people to be with one another or together? And what role do empathic psychological processes play, either as essential constituents or as typical elements? As I define it, to be genuinely with each other, persons must be jointly aware of their mutual openness to mutual relating. This means, I argue, that being with is a second-personal phenomenon in the sense I discuss in The Second-Person Standpoint. People who are with each other are in one another's presence, where the latter is a matter of second-personal standing or authority, as in the divine presence or in the king's presence. To be with someone is, therefore, to give the other second-personal standing, implicitly, to claim it for oneself and, thus, to enter into a relation of mutual accountability. Second-personal relating, I argue, requires a distinctive form of empathy, projective empathy, through which we imaginatively occupy others' perspectives and view ourselves as if from their point of view. Projective empathy is thus an essential constituent of 'being with.' But it is not the only form of empathy that being with typically involves. Further, I discuss ways in which emotional contagion, affect attunement, as well as projective empathy typically enter into the complex psychological (and ethical) phenomenon of being with another person. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Southern Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Southern Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2011 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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