KANT ON ENLIGHTENED MORAL PEDAGOGY.
abstract For Kant, the ideal of enlightenment is most fundamentally expressed as a self-developed soundness of judgment. But what does this mean when the judgment at issue is practical, that is, concerns the good to be brought about through action? I argue that the moral context places special deman...
| Published in: | Southern Journal of Philosophy Vol. 49; no. 3; pp. 227 - 254 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Fall2011
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=65152462&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 65152462 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384283 2GW jtl: Southern Journal of Philosophy issn: 00384283 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Fall2011 vid: 49 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 65152462 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2011.00072.x ppf: 227 ppct: 27 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 136KB tig: atl: KANT ON ENLIGHTENED MORAL PEDAGOGY. aug: au: MERRITT, MELISSA MCBAY affil: School of History and Philosophy at the University of New South Wales su: Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 Teaching Enlightenment Practical reason Moral education Ethical absolutism Practical judgment Ethics sug: subj: Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 Teaching Enlightenment Practical reason Moral education Ethical absolutism Practical judgment Ethics ab: abstract For Kant, the ideal of enlightenment is most fundamentally expressed as a self-developed soundness of judgment. But what does this mean when the judgment at issue is practical, that is, concerns the good to be brought about through action? I argue that the moral context places special demands on the ideal of enlightenment. This is revealed through an interpretation of Kant's prescription for moral pedagogy in the Critique of Practical Reason. The goal of the pedagogy is to cultivate the moral disposition, and the method consists of training in judgment. Unfortunately, Kant seems to wind up somewhere short of this goal, leaving the young person with only an idle wish for a properly cultivated moral disposition. In this paper, I argue that when we address the special issues that arise when the enlightenment ideal is brought to bear on practical judgment-issues that stem from the intrinsic connection between practical judgment and agency-we will see that there is no lacuna in Kant's account. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Southern Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Southern Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2011 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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