The metaphysics of rule-following.
This paper proposes a causal-dispositional account of rule-following as it occurs in reasoning and intentional agency. It defends this view against Kripke's (Wittgenstein on rules and private language, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, ) objection to dispositional accounts of rule-following, and...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 155; no. 3; pp. 345 - 370 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Oct2011
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=65180867&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 65180867 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2011 vid: 155 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 65180867 10.1007/s11098-010-9577-1 ppf: 345 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 231KB tig: atl: The metaphysics of rule-following. aug: au: Schlosser, Markus affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Leiden, 2300 RA Leiden The Netherlands su: Conformity Metaphysics Reasoning Disposition (Philosophy) Causation (Philosophy) sug: subj: Conformity Metaphysics Reasoning Disposition (Philosophy) Causation (Philosophy) keyword: Deviant causal chains Dispositions Metaphysics of agency Metaphysics of mind Rule-following ab: This paper proposes a causal-dispositional account of rule-following as it occurs in reasoning and intentional agency. It defends this view against Kripke's (Wittgenstein on rules and private language, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, ) objection to dispositional accounts of rule-following, and it proposes a solution to the problem of deviant causal chains. In the first part, I will outline the causal-dispositional approach. In the second part, I will follow Martin and Heil's (Philos Perspect 12:283-312, ) realist response to Kripke's challenge. I will propose an account that distinguishes between two kinds of rule-conformity and two kinds of rule-following, and I will defend the realist approach against two challenges that have recently been raised by Handfield and Bird (Philos Stud 140:285-298, ). In the third part, I will turn to the problem of deviant causal chains, and I will propose a new solution that is partly based on the realist account of rule-following. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2011. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2011 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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