Non-Conceptual Content and the Subjectivity of Consciousness.
The subjectivity of conscious experience is a central feature of our mental life that puzzles philosophers of mind. Conscious mental representations are presented to me as mine, others remain unconscious. How can we make sense of the difference between them? Some representationalists (e.g. Tye) atte...
| Publicado en: | International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 19; no. 3; pp. 491 - 521 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Jul2011
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=65247441&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 65247441 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09672559 5BE jtl: International Journal of Philosophical Studies issn: 09672559 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2011 vid: 19 iid: 3 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 65247441 10.1080/09672559.2011.595197 ppf: 491 ppct: 30 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 162KB tig: atl: Non-Conceptual Content and the Subjectivity of Consciousness. aug: au: Schlicht, Tobias affil: Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany su: Consciousness Mental discipline Representation (Philosophy) Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 Hanna, Robert Criticism (Philosophy) Subjectivity sug: subj: Consciousness Mental discipline Representation (Philosophy) Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 Hanna, Robert Criticism (Philosophy) Subjectivity keyword: Kant non-conceptual content phenomenal consciousness representationalism unity of consciousness ab: The subjectivity of conscious experience is a central feature of our mental life that puzzles philosophers of mind. Conscious mental representations are presented to me as mine, others remain unconscious. How can we make sense of the difference between them? Some representationalists (e.g. Tye) attempt to explain it in terms of non-conceptual intentional content, i.e. content for which one need not possess the relevant concept required in order to describe it. Hanna claims that Kant purports to explain the subjectivity of conscious experience in this way. This paper examines this claim in some detail in the context of a more general criticism of this kind of attempt to explain subjectivity and proposes a different reading of Kant that also leads to an alternative account of subjectivity independent from content. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of International Journal of Philosophical Studies is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: International Journal of Philosophical Studies holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2011 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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