Phenomenology and Artificial Intelligence.

Phenomenology is often thought to be irrelevant to artificial-intelligence and cognitive-science research because first-person descriptions do not reach to the level of genuine causal explanations. Although phenomenology taken in this weak sense may not be useful, the method of phenomenology taken m...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Metaphilosophy Vol. 33; no. 1/2; pp. 70 - 83
Autor principal: Beavers, Anthony F.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Jan2002
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=6534162&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 6534162
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00261068
        9OM
      jtl: Metaphilosophy
      issn: 00261068
      maglogo: Y
    pubinfo:
      dt: Jan2002
      vid: 33
      iid: 1/2
      pid: 480
      pub: Wiley-Blackwell
    artinfo:
      ui:
        6534162
        10.1111/1467-9973.00217
      ppf: 70
      ppct: 13
      formats:
        fmt:
          @attributes:
            type: P
            size: 51KB
      tig:
        atl: Phenomenology and Artificial Intelligence.
      aug:
        au: Beavers, Anthony F.
      su:
        Artificial intelligence
        Cognitive science
        Phenomenology
      sug:
        subj:
          Artificial intelligence
          Cognitive science
          Phenomenology
      ab: Phenomenology is often thought to be irrelevant to artificial-intelligence and cognitive-science research because first-person descriptions do not reach to the level of genuine causal explanations. Although phenomenology taken in this weak sense may not be useful, the method of phenomenology taken more formally may well produce fruitful results. Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, or epoché, sets the right frame of reference for a science of cognition because it makes explicit the difference between what belongs to cognition and what belongs to the natural world. Isolating this critical difference helps us assign the correct procedures to cognition and describe their functions. A formalized phenomenology of cognition can therefore aid initiatives in cognitive computing.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Copyright of Metaphilosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
      item: Metaphilosophy
      holder: Wiley-Blackwell
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2002
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N