The Puzzle of Imaginative Desire.

The puzzle of imaginative desire arises from the difficulty of accounting for the surprising behaviour of desire in imaginative activities such as our engagement with fiction and our games of pretend. Several philosophers have recently attempted to solve this puzzle by introducing a class of novel m...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 89; no. 3; pp. 421 - 440
Autor principal: Kind, Amy
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Taylor & Francis Ltd Sep2011
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=65365765&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 65365765
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00048402
        BHK
      jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy
      issn: 00048402
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Sep2011
      vid: 89
      iid: 3
      pid: 377
      pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd
    artinfo:
      ui:
        65365765
        10.1080/00048402.2010.503763
      ppf: 421
      ppct: 19
      formats:
        fmt:
          – @attributes:
              type: T
          – @attributes:
              type: P
              size: 137KB
      tig:
        atl: The Puzzle of Imaginative Desire.
      aug:
        au: Kind, Amy
        affil: Claremont McKenna College
      su:
        Desire (Philosophy)
        Imagination
        Ontology
        Normativity (Ethics)
        Motivation (Psychology)
      sug:
        subj:
          Desire (Philosophy)
          Imagination
          Ontology
          Normativity (Ethics)
          Motivation (Psychology)
      ab: The puzzle of imaginative desire arises from the difficulty of accounting for the surprising behaviour of desire in imaginative activities such as our engagement with fiction and our games of pretend. Several philosophers have recently attempted to solve this puzzle by introducing a class of novel mental states—what they call desire-like imaginings or i-desires. In this paper, I argue that we should reject the i-desire solution to the puzzle of imaginative desire. The introduction of i-desires is both ontologically profligate and unnecessary, and, most importantly, fails to make sense of what we are doing in the imaginative contexts in question.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
      item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy
      holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2011
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N