Hume's System of Space and Time.
Hume's account of the origin and nature of our ideas of space and time is generally thought to be the least satisfactory part of his empiricist system of philosophy. The main reason is internal in that the account is judged to be inconsistent with Hume's fundamental principle for the relationship be...
| Publicado en: | Logical Analysis & History of Philosophy / Philosophiegeschichte und Logische Analyse Vol. 13; pp. 76 - 90 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Mentis Verlag GmbH
2010
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=65792945&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 65792945 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 16173473 8XKV jtl: Logical Analysis & History of Philosophy / Philosophiegeschichte und Logische Analyse issn: 16173473 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2010 vid: 13 pid: 52771 pub: Mentis Verlag GmbH artinfo: ui: 65792945 ppf: 76 ppct: 14 formats: tig: atl: Hume's System of Space and Time. aug: au: Coventry, Angela M. affil: Portland State University su: Spacetime Metaphysics Empiricism Hume, David, 1711-1776 Philosophy sug: subj: Spacetime Metaphysics Empiricism Hume, David, 1711-1776 Philosophy ab: Hume's account of the origin and nature of our ideas of space and time is generally thought to be the least satisfactory part of his empiricist system of philosophy. The main reason is internal in that the account is judged to be inconsistent with Hume's fundamental principle for the relationship between senses and cognition, the copy principle. This paper defends Hume against the inconsistency objection by offering a new systematic interpretation of Hume on space and time and illuminating more generally the role of the copy principle in his philosophy. Humes Theorie des Wesens und des Ursprungs unserer Vorstellungen von Raum und Zeit wird generell zu den am wenigsten befriedigenden Teilen seiner empiristischen Philosophie gezählt. Der Hauptgrund dafür ist werkimmanent: Die Raum- Zeit-Theorie einerseits und Humes „copy principle" andererseits -- d.h. dasjenige Fundamental-Prinzip, das die Relation zwischen unseren Sinnen und unserem Denken regelt -- werden als miteinander inkonsistent erachtet. Dieser Beitrag bietet eine neue, systematische Interpretation der Raum-Zeit-Lehre Humes und eine umfassendere Darstellung der Rolle des „opy principles" in seiner Philosophie an. Auf diese Weise wird Hume gegen den Vorwurf der Inkonsistenz verteidigt. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y dt: @attributes: year: 2010 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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