Inconsistency in the A-Theory.

This paper presents a new argument against A-theories of time. A-theorists hold that there is an objective now (present moment) and an objective flow of time, the latter constituted by the movement of the objective now through time. A-theorists therefore want to draw different pictures of reality-sh...

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Publicado en:Philosophical Studies Vol. 156; no. 2; pp. 231 - 248
Autor principal: Smith, Nicholas
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Nov2011
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Smith, Nicholas
        affil: Department of Philosophy, The University of Sydney, Main Quadrangle A14 Sydney 2006 Australia
      su:
        Philosophy of time
        Inconsistency (Logic)
        Goal (Psychology)
        Present sense impressions (Evidence)
        Theory of knowledge
        Theorists
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        subj:
          Philosophy of time
          Inconsistency (Logic)
          Goal (Psychology)
          Present sense impressions (Evidence)
          Theory of knowledge
          Theorists
      keyword:
        A-theory
        B-theory
        Becoming
        Flow
        McTaggart
        Passage
        Time
      ab: This paper presents a new argument against A-theories of time. A-theorists hold that there is an objective now (present moment) and an objective flow of time, the latter constituted by the movement of the objective now through time. A-theorists therefore want to draw different pictures of reality-showing the objective now in different positions-depending upon the time at which the picture is drawn. In this paper it is argued that the times at which the different pictures are drawn may be taken to be normal times or hypertimes. If they are normal times then the A-theory is inconsistent, or else collapses to the B-theory-and appealing to primitive tense operators will not help A-theorists avoid this conclusion. If the times are hypertimes then the A-theory is consistent, but deeply problematic none the less.
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    language: English
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