How the World Is Measured Up in Size Experience.
I develop a Russellian representationalist account of size experience that draws importantly from contemporary vision science research on size perception. The core view is that size is experienced in 'body-scaled' units. So, an object might, say, be experienced as two eye-level units high. The view...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 83; no. 2; pp. 345 - 362 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2011
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=65926387&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 65926387 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318205 PPO jtl: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research issn: 00318205 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2011 vid: 83 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 65926387 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00431.x ppf: 345 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 222KB tig: atl: How the World Is Measured Up in Size Experience. aug: au: BENNETT, DAVID J. affil: Brown University su: Representation (Philosophy) Conflict management Motivation (Psychology) Phenomenology Peacocke, Christopher sug: subj: Representation (Philosophy) Conflict management Motivation (Psychology) Phenomenology Peacocke, Christopher ab: I develop a Russellian representationalist account of size experience that draws importantly from contemporary vision science research on size perception. The core view is that size is experienced in 'body-scaled' units. So, an object might, say, be experienced as two eye-level units high. The view is sharpened in response to Thompson's (forthcoming) Doubled Earth example. This example is presented by Thompson as part of an argument for a Fregean view of size experience. But I argue that the Russellian view I develop handles the Doubled Earth example in a natural and illuminating way, thereby avoiding the need to posit irreducible experiential 'modes of presentation'. I also address a kind of neo-Fregean 'reference-fixing' view of size experience, that shares features with the Russellian view developed. I give reasons for favoring the latter. Finally, I argue that Peacocke's claim that spatial experience is 'unit free' is not persuasive. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy & Phenomenological Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2011 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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