The Independence Thesis: When Individual and Social Epistemology Diverge.
Several philosophers of science have argued that epistemically rational individuals might form epistemically irrational groups and that, conversely, rational groups might be composed of irrational individuals. We call the conjunction of these two claims the Independence Thesis, as they entail that m...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 78; no. 4; pp. 653 - 678 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Oct2011
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=66164284&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 66164284 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2011 vid: 78 iid: 4 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 66164284 10.1086/661777 ppf: 653 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 326KB tig: atl: The Independence Thesis: When Individual and Social Epistemology Diverge. aug: au: Mayo-Wilson, Conor Zollman, Kevin J. S. Danks, David affil: Department of Philosophy, Baker Hall 135, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 su: Philosophy of science Theory of knowledge History of science Methodology Social groups sug: subj: Philosophy of science Theory of knowledge History of science Methodology Social groups ab: Several philosophers of science have argued that epistemically rational individuals might form epistemically irrational groups and that, conversely, rational groups might be composed of irrational individuals. We call the conjunction of these two claims the Independence Thesis, as they entail that methodological prescriptions for scientific communities and those for individual scientists are logically independent. We defend the inconsistency thesis by characterizing four criteria for epistemic rationality and then proving that, under said criteria, individuals will be judged rational when groups are not and vice versa. We then explain the implications of our results for descriptive history of science and normative epistemology. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2011 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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