Deferentialism.
There is a recent and growing trend in philosophy that involves deferring to the claims of certain disciplines outside of philosophy, such as mathematics, the natural sciences, and linguistics. According to this trend- deferentialism, as we will call it-certain disciplines outside of philosophy make...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 156; no. 3; pp. 321 - 338 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Dec2011
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=66885092&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 66885092 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2011 vid: 156 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 66885092 10.1007/s11098-010-9596-y ppf: 321 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 1.6MB tig: atl: Deferentialism. aug: au: Daly, Chris Liggins, David affil: Philosophy, School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester, Oxford Road Manchester M13 9PL UK su: Philosophy Methodology Naturalism Natural history Mathematics Linguistics sug: subj: Philosophy Methodology Naturalism Natural history Mathematics Linguistics ab: There is a recent and growing trend in philosophy that involves deferring to the claims of certain disciplines outside of philosophy, such as mathematics, the natural sciences, and linguistics. According to this trend- deferentialism, as we will call it-certain disciplines outside of philosophy make claims that have a decisive bearing on philosophical disputes, where those claims are more epistemically justified than any philosophical considerations just because those claims are made by those disciplines. Deferentialists believe that certain longstanding philosophical problems can be swiftly and decisively dispatched by appeal to disciplines other than philosophy. In this paper we will argue that such an attitude of uncritical deference to any non-philosophical discipline is badly misguided. With reference to the work of John Burgess and David Lewis, we consider deference to mathematics. We show that deference to mathematics is implausible and that main arguments for it fail. With reference to the work of Michael Blome-Tillmann, we consider deference to linguistics. We show that his arguments appealing to deference to linguistics are unsuccessful. We then show that naturalism does not entail deferentialism and that naturalistic considerations even motivate some anti-deferentialist views. Finally, we set out deferentialism's failings and present our own anti-deferentialist approach to philosophical inquiry. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2011. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2011 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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