Models and mechanisms in psychological explanation.
Mechanistic explanation has an impressive track record of advancing our understanding of complex, hierarchically organized physical systems, particularly biological and neural systems. But not every complex system can be understood mechanistically. Psychological capacities are often understood by pr...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 183; no. 3; pp. 313 - 339 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2011
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=66903732&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 66903732 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2011 vid: 183 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 66903732 10.1007/s11229-011-9958-9 ppf: 313 ppct: 26 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 257KB tig: atl: Models and mechanisms in psychological explanation. aug: au: Weiskopf, Daniel affil: Department of Philosophy, Georgia State University, Atlanta USA su: Cognitive psychology research Computational neuroscience Mechanism (Philosophy) Functional analysis Componential analysis (Linguistics) sug: subj: Cognitive psychology research Computational neuroscience Mechanism (Philosophy) Functional analysis Componential analysis (Linguistics) keyword: Cognition Mechanisms Models Psychological explanation Realization ab: Mechanistic explanation has an impressive track record of advancing our understanding of complex, hierarchically organized physical systems, particularly biological and neural systems. But not every complex system can be understood mechanistically. Psychological capacities are often understood by providing cognitive models of the systems that underlie them. I argue that these models, while superficially similar to mechanistic models, in fact have a substantially more complex relation to the real underlying system. They are typically constructed using a range of techniques for abstracting the functional properties of the system, which may not coincide with its mechanistic organization. I describe these techniques and show that despite being non-mechanistic, these cognitive models can satisfy the normative constraints on good explanations. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2011. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2011 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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