Why the Empty Shells Were Not Fired: A Semi-Bibliographical Note.

This note documents Aumann's reason for omitting the 'empty shells' argument for the common prior assumption from the final version of 'Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality.' It then continues to discuss the argument and concludes that rational entities cannot learn their...

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Publicado en:Episteme (Edinburgh University Press) Vol. 8; no. 3; pp. 301 - 309
Autor principal: Gilboa, Itzhak
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Edinburgh University Press 2011
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        Motivation (Psychology)
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          Bayesian analysis
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          Motivation (Psychology)
      ab: This note documents Aumann's reason for omitting the 'empty shells' argument for the common prior assumption from the final version of 'Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality.' It then continues to discuss the argument and concludes that rational entities cannot learn their own identity; if they do not know it a priori, they never will.
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