THE NECESSITY OF CONTINGENCY OR CONTINGENT NECESSITY: MEILLASSOUX, HEGEL, AND THE SUBJECT.
This article addresses the relationship of contingency to necessity as developed by Quentin Meillassoux and G.W.F. Hegel. Meillassoux criticizes the restriction of possibility by modern philosophy to the conditions of the transcendental subject, which he calls 'correlationism', and opposes to this c...
| Published in: | Cosmos & History Vol. 7; no. 1; pp. 128 - 142 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Ashton & Rafferty
2011
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=67612614&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 67612614 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 18329101 78JL jtl: Cosmos & History issn: 18329101 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2011 vid: 7 iid: 1 pid: 47219 pub: Ashton & Rafferty artinfo: ui: 67612614 ppf: 128 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 193KB tig: atl: THE NECESSITY OF CONTINGENCY OR CONTINGENT NECESSITY: MEILLASSOUX, HEGEL, AND THE SUBJECT. aug: au: Houdt, John Van affil: Tilburg University su: Contingency (Philosophy) Modern philosophy Meillassoux, Quentin, 1967- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831 Metaphysics Mathematical proofs Necessity (Philosophy) sug: subj: Contingency (Philosophy) Modern philosophy Meillassoux, Quentin, 1967- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831 Metaphysics Mathematical proofs Necessity (Philosophy) keyword: Contingency Correlationism Hegel Mathematics Meillassoux Necessity Proof Subject ab: This article addresses the relationship of contingency to necessity as developed by Quentin Meillassoux and G.W.F. Hegel. Meillassoux criticizes the restriction of possibility by modern philosophy to the conditions of the transcendental subject, which he calls 'correlationism', and opposes to this correlationism, mathematics as an absolute form of thought. The arch-figure of a metaphysical version of correlationism for Meillassoux is Hegel. This article argues that, while Meillassoux is right to criticize a version of correlationism for restricting the range of contingency, he overlooks Hegel's unique contribution to this issue. Hegel provides us a version of necessity modeled on the mathematical proof which answers Meillassoux's concerns about correlationist versions of necessity but does not altogether jettison the concept of the subject. Instead, the subject in Hegel is a contingent interruption which emerges from the breaks in the kinds of necessity we posit about the world. Hegel offers us a way of tying these two concepts together in what I call 'contingent necessity'. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Cosmos & History is the property of Ashton & Rafferty and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Cosmos & History holder: Ashton & Rafferty dt: @attributes: year: 2011 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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