Neurosentimentalism and Moral Agency.
Metaethics has recently been confronted by evidence from cognitive neuroscience that tacit emotional processes play an essential causal role in moral judgement. Most neuroscientists, and some metaethicists, take this evidence to vindicate a version of metaethical sentimentalism. In this paper we arg...
| Publicado en: | Mind (0026-4423) Vol. 119; no. 475; pp. 585 - 615 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Jul2010
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=69709244&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 69709244 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00264423 MND jtl: Mind (0026-4423) issn: 00264423 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2010 vid: 119 iid: 475 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 69709244 10.1093/mind/fzq037 ppf: 585 ppct: 30 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 144KB tig: atl: Neurosentimentalism and Moral Agency. aug: au: Gerrans, Philip Kennett, Jeanette affil: The University of Adelaide philip.gerrans@adelaide.edu.au Macquarie University jeanette.kennett@scmp.mq.edu.au su: Sentimentalism Metaethics Cognitive neuroscience Neuroscientists Philosophy sug: subj: Sentimentalism Metaethics Cognitive neuroscience Neuroscientists Philosophy ab: Metaethics has recently been confronted by evidence from cognitive neuroscience that tacit emotional processes play an essential causal role in moral judgement. Most neuroscientists, and some metaethicists, take this evidence to vindicate a version of metaethical sentimentalism. In this paper we argue that the ‘dual process’ model of cognition that frames the discussion within and without philosophy does not do justice to an important constraint on any theory of deliberation and judgement. Namely, decision-making is the exercise of a capacity for agency. Agency, in turn, requires a capacity to conceive of oneself as temporally extended: to inhabit, in both memory and imagination, an autobiographical past and future. To plan, to commit to plans, and to act in accordance with previous plans requires a diachronic self, able to transcend the present moment. While this fact about agency is central to much of moral philosophy (e.g. in discussions of autonomy and moral responsibility) it is opaque to the dual process framework and those meta-ethical accounts which situate themselves within this model of cognition. We show how this is the case and argue for an empirically adequate account of moral judgement which gives sufficient role to memory and imagination as cognitive prerequisites of agency. We reconsider the empirical evidence, provide an alternative, agentive, interpretation of key findings, and evaluate the consequences for metaethics. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Mind Association. item: Mind (0026-4423) holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2010 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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