Defending Dualism from Ockham's Razor: Why Physicalism Is just as "Spooky" as Dualism.
The central question in the field of philosophy of mind is the general inquiry into the nature of the mind. Is the mind simply the brain itself? Is it a function of any organ or system like a brain? Is it some non-physical substance? This paper examines the metaphysical debate between physicalism, o...
| Publicado en: | Dialogue (00122246) Vol. 54; no. 1; pp. 16 - 23 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Phi Sigma Tau
2011
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | The central question in the field of philosophy of mind is the general inquiry into the nature of the mind. Is the mind simply the brain itself? Is it a function of any organ or system like a brain? Is it some non-physical substance? This paper examines the metaphysical debate between physicalism, or materialism, and dualism within the context of philosophy of mind. J. J. C. Smart's articulation of how Ockham's razor allows us to choose physicalism over dualism is critiqued under the premise that physicalism as an explanatory theory is not in fact simpler than dualism. It is argued that physicalism leads to conclusions or contradictions that are just as "strange" or "spooky" as a ghost in a machine. Throughout the analysis, significant attention is given to essays by Frank Jackson and Paul and Patricia Churchland in reference to qualia. |
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