Evolved cognitive biases and the epistemic status of scientific beliefs.
Our ability for scientific reasoning is a byproduct of cognitive faculties that evolved in response to problems related to survival and reproduction. Does this observation increase the epistemic standing of science, or should we treat scientific knowledge with suspicion? The conclusions one draws fr...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 157; no. 3; pp. 411 - 430 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2012
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=69969203&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 69969203 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2012 vid: 157 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 69969203 10.1007/s11098-010-9661-6 ppf: 411 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 294KB tig: atl: Evolved cognitive biases and the epistemic status of scientific beliefs. aug: au: Cruz, Helen Smedt, Johan affil: Centre for Logic and Analytic Philosophy, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2 3000 Leuven Belgium Department of Philosophy and Ethics, Ghent University, Blandijnberg 2 9000 Ghent Belgium su: Epistemics Judgment (Logic) Suspicion Philosophy Theory of knowledge sug: subj: Epistemics Judgment (Logic) Suspicion Philosophy Theory of knowledge keyword: Biased cultural transmission Evolutionary arguments Evolutionary debunking arguments Intuitive ontologies Scientific knowledge ab: Our ability for scientific reasoning is a byproduct of cognitive faculties that evolved in response to problems related to survival and reproduction. Does this observation increase the epistemic standing of science, or should we treat scientific knowledge with suspicion? The conclusions one draws from applying evolutionary theory to scientific beliefs depend to an important extent on the validity of evolutionary arguments (EAs) or evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs). In this paper we show through an analytical model that cultural transmission of scientific knowledge can lead toward representations that are more truth-approximating or more efficient at solving science-related problems under a broad range of circumstances, even under conditions where human cognitive faculties would be further off the mark than they actually are. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2012. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2012 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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