A Dual Aspect Account of Moral Language.
It is often observed in metaethics that moral language displays a certain duality in as much as it seems to concern both objective facts in the world and subjective attitudes that move to action. In this paper, I defend The Dual Aspect Account which is intended to capture this duality: A person's ut...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 84; no. 1; pp. 87 - 123 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jan2012
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=69971299&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 69971299 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318205 PPO jtl: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research issn: 00318205 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jan2012 vid: 84 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 69971299 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00447.x ppf: 87 ppct: 36 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 198KB tig: atl: A Dual Aspect Account of Moral Language. aug: au: STRANDBERG, CAJ affil: University of Gothenburg and Lund University su: Human acts (Ethics) Ethics Conduct of life Virtue Conscience sug: subj: Human acts (Ethics) Ethics Conduct of life Virtue Conscience ab: It is often observed in metaethics that moral language displays a certain duality in as much as it seems to concern both objective facts in the world and subjective attitudes that move to action. In this paper, I defend The Dual Aspect Account which is intended to capture this duality: A person's utterance of a sentence according to which φing has a moral characteristic, such as 'φing is wrong,' conveys two things: The sentence expresses, in virtue of its conventional meaning, the belief that φing has a moral property, and the utterance of the sentence carries a generalized conversational implicature to the effect that the person in question has an action-guiding attitude in relation to φing. This account has significant advantages over competing views: ( i) As it is purely cognitivist, it does not have the difficulties of expressivism and various ecumenical positions. ( ii) Yet, in spite of this, it can explain the close, 'meaning-like,' connection between moral language and attitudes. ( iii) In contrast to other pragmatic accounts, it is compatible with any relevant cognitivist view. ( iv) It does not rest on a contentious pragmatic notion, such as conventional implicature. ( v) It does not imply that utterances of complex moral sentences, such as conditionals, convey attitudes. In addition, the generalized implicature in question is fully calculable and cancellable. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy & Phenomenological Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2012 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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