Theory Choice and Social Choice: Kuhn versus Arrow.
Kuhn’s famous thesis that there is ‘no unique algorithm’ for choosing between rival scientific theories is analysed using the machinery of social choice theory. It is shown that the problem of theory choice as posed by Kuhn is formally identical to a standard social choice problem. This suggests tha...
| Publicado en: | Mind (0026-4423) Vol. 120; no. 477; pp. 83 - 116 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Jan2011
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=70005405&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 70005405 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00264423 MND jtl: Mind (0026-4423) issn: 00264423 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2011 vid: 120 iid: 477 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 70005405 10.1093/mind/fzr010 ppf: 83 ppct: 33 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 194KB tig: atl: Theory Choice and Social Choice: Kuhn versus Arrow. aug: au: Okasha, Samir affil: University of Bristol samir.okasha@bristol.ac.uk su: Social choice Preferences (Philosophy) Philosophical research Kuhn, Thomas S., 1922-1996 Bayesian analysis Algorithms sug: subj: Social choice Preferences (Philosophy) Philosophical research Kuhn, Thomas S., 1922-1996 Bayesian analysis Algorithms ab: Kuhn’s famous thesis that there is ‘no unique algorithm’ for choosing between rival scientific theories is analysed using the machinery of social choice theory. It is shown that the problem of theory choice as posed by Kuhn is formally identical to a standard social choice problem. This suggests that analogues of well-known results from the social choice literature, such as Arrow’s impossibility theorem, may apply to theory choice. If an analogue of Arrow’s theorem does hold for theory choice this would refute Kuhn’s thesis, but it would also pose a threat to the rationality of science, a threat that is if anything more worrying than that posed by Kuhn. Various possible ‘escape routes’ from Arrow’s impossibility result are examined, in particular Amartya Sen’s idea of ‘enriching the informational basis’. It is shown that Sen’s idea can be applied to the problem of theory choice in science. This in turn sheds light on two well-known approaches to inductive inference in philosophy of science: Bayesianism and statistical model selection. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Mind Association. item: Mind (0026-4423) holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2011 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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