The Argument from Animal and Infant Perception.
I discuss an argument for non-conceptualism based on animal and infant perception. Crudely put, some animals and infants who possess no concepts nonetheless have perceptual states with non-conceptual content. Perceptual experiences of adult humans have the same kind of content as the experiences of...
| Publicado en: | Teorema Vol. 29; no. 2; pp. 97 - 111 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Teorema
2010
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=70057999&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 70057999 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 02101602 IHG jtl: Teorema issn: 02101602 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2010 vid: 29 iid: 2 pid: 20677 pub: Teorema artinfo: ui: 70057999 ppf: 97 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 195KB tig: atl: The Argument from Animal and Infant Perception. aug: au: Schmidt, Eva affil: Philosophisches Institut, Universität des Saarlandes, Postfach 15 11 10, 66041 Saarbrücken, Germany su: Animal cognition Animal intelligence Animal psychology Psychology of adults Learning in animals Perception (Philosophy) McDowell, John Empirical research Perception in animals Conceptualism Perception in infants sug: subj: Animal cognition Animal intelligence Animal psychology Psychology of adults Learning in animals Perception (Philosophy) McDowell, John Empirical research Perception in animals Conceptualism Perception in infants keyword: Animal Minds Concepts John McDowell Non-Conceptualism Philosophy of Perception conceptos filosofía de la percepción John McDowell mentalidad animal no conceptualismo ab: I discuss an argument for non-conceptualism based on animal and infant perception. Crudely put, some animals and infants who possess no concepts nonetheless have perceptual states with non-conceptual content. Perceptual experiences of adult humans have the same kind of content as the experiences of animals and infants, so the content of the perceptual experiences of adult humans is also non-conceptual. I defend this argument against potential attacks from the conceptualist. I argue that there are indeed creatures which possess no concepts, but have perceptual experiences, and I attack McDowell's view that we share perceptual sensitivity with animals and infants, but not genuine perceptual contents. En este trabajo planteo un argumento a favor el no-conceptualismo basado en la percepción animal e infantil. Dicho sucintamente, algunos animales y algunos niños que no poseen conceptos tienen sin embargo estados perceptivos con contenido no-conceptual. Las experiencias perceptivas de los seres humanos adultos tienen el mismo género de contenido que las experiencias de los animales y los niños; de manera que el contenido de las experiencias perceptivas de los seres humanos adultos es asi-mismo no-conceptual. Defiendo este argumento contra los posibles ataques de los conceptualistas. Aduzco que evidentemente existen criaturas que no poseen conceptos, aunque tienen experiencias perceptivas, y combato la opinión de McDowell de que compartimos sensibilidad perceptiva con animales y niños pero no contenidos perceptivos genuinos. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Teorema is the property of Teorema and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Teorema holder: Teorema dt: @attributes: year: 2010 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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