What could be caused must actually be caused.
I give two arguments for the claim that all events which occur at the actual world and are such that they could be caused, are also such that they must actually be caused. The first argument is an improvement of a similar argument advanced by Alexander Pruss, which I show to be invalid. It uses Prus...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 184; no. 3; pp. 299 - 318 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2012
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=70069539&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 70069539 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2012 vid: 184 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 70069539 10.1007/s11229-010-9814-3 ppf: 299 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 278KB tig: atl: What could be caused must actually be caused. aug: au: Weaver, Christopher affil: Rutgers University, New Brunswick USA su: Pruss, Alexander R., 1973- Counterfactuals (Logic) Semantics Affirmations (Self-help) Causation (Philosophy) Conditionals (Logic) Natural law sug: subj: Pruss, Alexander R., 1973- Counterfactuals (Logic) Semantics Affirmations (Self-help) Causation (Philosophy) Conditionals (Logic) Natural law keyword: Causation Conditionals Counterfactual logic Counterfactuals Natural laws Quantum physics ab: I give two arguments for the claim that all events which occur at the actual world and are such that they could be caused, are also such that they must actually be caused. The first argument is an improvement of a similar argument advanced by Alexander Pruss, which I show to be invalid. It uses Pruss's Brouwer Analog for counterfactual logic, and, as a consequence, implies inconsistency with Lewis's semantics for counterfactuals. While (I suggest) this consequence may not be objectionable, the argument founders on the fact that Pruss's Brouwer Analog has a clear counterexample. I thus turn to a second, 'Lewisian' argument, which requires only an affirmation of one element of Lewis's analysis of causation and one other, fairly weak possibility claim about the nature of wholly contingent events. The final section of the paper explains how both arguments escape objections from supposed indeterminacy in quantum physics. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2012. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2012 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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