Style, but Substance: An Epistemology of Visual versus Numerical Representation in Scientific Practice.
In practice, scientists must convey data in a "representational style" (e.g., as a numerical array or visual representation). Various authors seek to explain the epistemic role of scientific visual representation in terms of formal conventions (e.g., Goodman, Perini, and Kulvicki). Goodman also tend...
| Published in: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 78; no. 5; pp. 774 - 788 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Cambridge University Press
Dec2011
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=70256743&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 70256743 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2011 vid: 78 iid: 5 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 70256743 10.1086/662567 ppf: 774 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 2.9MB tig: atl: Style, but Substance: An Epistemology of Visual versus Numerical Representation in Scientific Practice. aug: au: Irving, Zachary C. su: Representation (Philosophy) Theory of knowledge Scientific method Visualization Mathematical models Philosophy of science sug: subj: Representation (Philosophy) Theory of knowledge Scientific method Visualization Mathematical models Philosophy of science ab: In practice, scientists must convey data in a "representational style" (e.g., as a numerical array or visual representation). Various authors seek to explain the epistemic role of scientific visual representation in terms of formal conventions (e.g., Goodman, Perini, and Kulvicki). Goodman also tends to dismiss the epistemic relevance of human cognition. My position is that visual conventions are nonarbitrary, in that they play to scientists' cognitive abilities and limitations. My account draws on Perini's formal analysis, scientific case studies, and empirical literature on global pattern detection in neurotypicals, autistics, and dyslexics. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2011 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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