Negotiating boundaries in the definition of life: Wittgensteinian and Darwinian insights on resolving conceptual border conflicts.
What is the definition of life? Artificial life environments provide an interesting test case for this classical question. Understanding what such systems can tell us about biological life requires negotiating the tricky conceptual boundary between virtual and real life forms. Drawing from Wittgenst...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 185; no. 1; pp. 5 - 21 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Mar2012
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=70934296&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 70934296 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2012 vid: 185 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 70934296 10.1007/s11229-011-9873-0 ppf: 5 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 166KB tig: atl: Negotiating boundaries in the definition of life: Wittgensteinian and Darwinian insights on resolving conceptual border conflicts. aug: au: Pennock, Robert su: Boundary disputes Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951 Darwin, Charles, 1809-1882 Artificial life Pluralism sug: subj: Boundary disputes Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951 Darwin, Charles, 1809-1882 Artificial life Pluralism keyword: Classification Cluster concept Darwinian evolution Definition of life Digital evolution ab: What is the definition of life? Artificial life environments provide an interesting test case for this classical question. Understanding what such systems can tell us about biological life requires negotiating the tricky conceptual boundary between virtual and real life forms. Drawing from Wittgenstein's analysis of the concept of a game and a Darwinian insight about classification, I argue that classifying life involves both causal and pragmatic elements. Rather than searching for a single, sharp definition, these considerations suggest that life is a cluster concept with fuzzy boundaries and that there are multiple legitimate ways to make the notion precise for different scientific purposes. This pluralist, realist account avoids unnecessary border disputes by emphasizing how science negotiates such questions in relation to theory and evidence. I also discuss several objections to this approach, including a 'moral hesitation' some have to allowing broader application of the concept of life to include artificial life. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2012. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2012 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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