Advance Directives and Personal Identity: What Is the Problem?
The personal identity problem expresses the worry that due to disrupted psychological continuity, one person’s advance directive could be used to determine the care of a different person. Even ethicists, who strongly question the possibility of the scenario depicted by the proponents of the personal...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Medicine & Philosophy Vol. 37; no. 1; pp. 60 - 74 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Jan2012
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=70947884&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 70947884 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 03605310 MPS jtl: Journal of Medicine & Philosophy issn: 03605310 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2012 vid: 37 iid: 1 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 70947884 10.1093/jmp/jhr055 ppf: 60 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 151KB tig: atl: Advance Directives and Personal Identity: What Is the Problem? aug: au: Furberg, Elisabeth affil: Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden su: Advance directives (Medical care) Identity (Psychology) Medical ethics Utilitarianism Autonomy (Philosophy) Dworkin, Ronald, 1931-2013 Medicine & philosophy sug: subj: Advance directives (Medical care) Identity (Psychology) Medical ethics Utilitarianism Autonomy (Philosophy) Dworkin, Ronald, 1931-2013 Medicine & philosophy keyword: advance directives medical ethics normative theory personal identity ab: The personal identity problem expresses the worry that due to disrupted psychological continuity, one person’s advance directive could be used to determine the care of a different person. Even ethicists, who strongly question the possibility of the scenario depicted by the proponents of the personal identity problem, often consider it to be a very potent objection to the use of advance directives. Aiming to question this assumption, I, in this paper, discuss the personal identity problem’s relevance to the moral force of advance directives. By putting the personal identity argument in relation to two different normative frameworks, I aim to show that whether or not the personal identity problem is relevant to the moral force of advance directives, and further, in what way it is relevant, depends entirely on what normative reasons we have for respecting advance directives in the first place. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Inc.. item: Journal of Medicine & Philosophy holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2012 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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