Evolving to Divide the Fruits of Cooperation.
Cooperation and the allocation of common resources are core features of social behavior. Games idealizing both interactions have been studied separately. But here, rather than examining the dynamics of the individual games, the interactions are combined so that players first choose whether to cooper...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 79; no. 1; pp. 81 - 95 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Jan2012
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=71425941&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 71425941 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2012 vid: 79 iid: 1 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 71425941 10.1086/663243 ppf: 81 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 560KB tig: atl: Evolving to Divide the Fruits of Cooperation. aug: au: Wagner, Elliott O. affil: Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, School of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA 92612 su: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Cooperation Mathematical models Game theory Fairness Negotiation Nash equilibrium sug: subj: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Cooperation Mathematical models Game theory Fairness Negotiation Nash equilibrium ab: Cooperation and the allocation of common resources are core features of social behavior. Games idealizing both interactions have been studied separately. But here, rather than examining the dynamics of the individual games, the interactions are combined so that players first choose whether to cooperate, and then, if they jointly cooperate, they bargain over the fruits of their cooperation. It is shown that the dynamics of the combined game cannot simply be reduced to the dynamics of the individual games and that both cooperation and fair division are more likely in the combined game than in the constituent games taken separately. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2012 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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