The Exemplification of Rules: An Appraisal of Pettit’s Approach to the Problem of Rule-following.

This paper offers an appraisal of Phillip Pettit’s approach to the problem how a merely finite set of examples can serve to represent a determinate rule, given that indefinitely many rules can be extrapolated from any such set. I argue that Pettit’s so-called ethocentric theory of rule-following fai...

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Publicado en:International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 20; no. 1; pp. 69 - 91
Autor principal: Watts, Daniel
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Taylor & Francis Ltd Feb2012
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: The Exemplification of Rules: An Appraisal of Pettit’s Approach to the Problem of Rule-following.
      aug:
        au: Watts, Daniel
        affil: University of Essex, United Kingdom
      su:
        Rules (Philosophy)
        Example
        Ethnocentrism
        Culture
        Extrapolation
        Civilization
      sug:
        subj:
          Rules (Philosophy)
          Example
          Ethnocentrism
          Culture
          Extrapolation
          Civilization
      keyword:
        exemplification
        Kripke
        Pettit
        rule-following
        rules
        the ethocentric theory
      ab: This paper offers an appraisal of Phillip Pettit’s approach to the problem how a merely finite set of examples can serve to represent a determinate rule, given that indefinitely many rules can be extrapolated from any such set. I argue that Pettit’s so-called ethocentric theory of rule-following fails to deliver the solution to this problem he sets out to provide. More constructively, I consider what further provisions are needed in order to advance Pettit’s general approach to the problem. I conclude that what is needed is an account that, whilst it affirms the view that agents’ responses are constitutively involved in the exemplification of rules, does not allow such responses the pride of place they have in Pettit’s theory.
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